21 January 2010

Experts urge adoption of Israeli air security system

Did Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab do us a favor? "More than eight years after 9/11, he revealed that our multi-billion dollar airport security system doesn’t work," writes Clifford D. May, president of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on terrorism.

It doesn’t work because it was conceptualized as a search for weapons -- or anything that might be used as a weapon. "On Christmas Day you can bet TSA agents confiscated plenty of nail files and toothpaste, even if they did miss the explosives in Umar’s undershorts," he says.

The system needs to be reinvented. His suggestion:

Move to a quasi-Israeli model. "The Israelis’ priority is to find the terrorists rather than the weapons. They have trained agents asking passengers simple questions. The answers lead either to reassurance or suspicion," he writes.

The admitted problem with this approach is scalability.

The US has millions of passengers coming and going through hundreds of airports. But perhaps there’s a way to apply the Israelis’ general principle: Have a relatively small number of TSA agents "walking the beat" at airports, taking advantage of the time passengers spend waiting in line, May suggests.

Those who exhibit questionable behavior would be questioned - - politely. Less than satisfactory answers would lead to further questioning in a more private setting, enhanced screening, the assignment of an air marshal to a specific plane or the passenger being delayed for further scrutiny.

"Who should the TSA hire and train for these positions? I would suggest they reach out to retired police detectives, FBI agents and journalists - people who have already spent decades asking questions and judging responses," May says.

He also urges setting up a voluntary travelers’ registry: "I doubt I’m alone in my willingness to let airport security know as much about me when I travel as American Express does when I buy a pair of shoes. Being a registered traveler will not exclude anyone from security checks. But it could make traveling a bit easier while helping security officials establish priorities," he writes.

Also, he suggests using advanced technology: Former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff points out that most airport security checkpoints use metal detectors which can’t detect explosives. Chertoff suggests instead using "whole-body imagers," which he says, would "detect non-metal weapons."

In addition, May urges fixing the visa system: "Currently, visas are stamped by the youngest, least experienced Foreign Service Officers. We need professional consular officers who will ask hard questions and make tough decisions - like not giving a multiple entry and exit visa to a 23-year-old Nigerian with a checkered history," he writes.

By David Wilkening

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ion and size are the weaknesses

The criminal element will doubtless confirm it is easier to fool an automated process be it communications fraud, credit card fraud or anything else. The greater the 'distance' separating the vetting mechanism from the vetted the easier it is to fool or bypass. This is what plagues America's much vaunted security apparatus. They tap all manner of data (do they really need ALL the manifests of ALL flights departing Bangkok International to ALL destinations?), telephone/cell calls, SMS, e-mails, etc. from all over the world. Australia, Britain, Canada and the U.S. are joined at the hip through the Echelon network and the National Security Agency has a huge dish farm in Menwith, Yorkshire. Yet the Detroit bomber demonstrates a simple systemic failure - the inability of the U.S. monster machine to detect the problem passenger until halfway across the Atlantic. Kind of late! Pathetic. The U.S. already employs profile screeners at its airports but the biggest problem is outside the U.S. - where potential miscreants originate. And why should countries of departure assume all the costs of security when it is the U.S. that drives terrorists? The Israeli model is on the right track, a face-to-face chat with prospective passengers. Another aspect is the over-reaction by the U.S. Again, they should learn from some countries, including Israel, where an incident of any kind - even vehicle crashes - is quickly cleaned up and life continues as normal. The U.S. over-reaction, with added inconvenience to the travelling public, only serves to satisfy the terrorists sitting in their tents in the Yemeni desert watching internal news channels. Even failed attacks serve their purposes, as well as providing intelligence on how to improve techniques for their next attempt. Today's airport security is more of a publicity trick to persuade passengers things are under control - they even search pilots about to fly an aircraft, as if they haven't alternate methods of destroying an aircraft.

By J Hewson, Tuesday, January 26, 2010